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Abstract 
In McAleer et al. (2010b), a robust risk management strategy to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) was proposed under the Basel II Accord by selecting a Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) forecast that combines the forecasts of different VaR models. The robust forecast 
was based on the median of the point VaR forecasts of a set of conditional volatility 
models. In this paper we provide further evidence on the suitability of the median as a 
GFC-robust strategy by using an additional set of new extreme value forecasting models 
and by extending the sample period for comparison. These extreme value models 
include DPOT and Conditional EVT. Such models might be expected to be useful in 
explaining financial data, especially in the presence of extreme shocks that arise during 
a GFC. Our empirical results confirm that the median remains GFC-robust even in the 
presence of these new extreme value models. This is illustrated by using the S&P500 
index before, during and after the 2008-09 GFC. We investigate the performance of a 
variety of single and combined VaR forecasts in terms of daily capital requirements and 
violation penalties under the Basel II Accord, as well as other criteria, including several 
tests for independence of the violations. The strategy based on the median, or more 
generally, on combined forecasts of single models, is straightforward to incorporate into 
existing computer software packages that are used by banks and other financial 
institutions.  
 
Keywords: Value-at-Risk (VaR), DPOT, daily capital charges, robust forecasts, 
violation penalties, optimizing strategy, aggressive risk management, conservative risk 
management, Basel, global financial crisis. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, G11, G17, C53, C22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 has led to substantial empirical analyses 
and public policy debate, and left an indelible mark on economic and financial 
structures worldwide, and caused a generation of investors and researchers to wonder 
how things could have become so bad (see, for example, Borio (2008)), There have 
been many questions asked about whether appropriate regulations were in place, 
especially in the USA, which does not enforce the Basel Accord regulations as a non-
subscriber, to ensure the appropriate monitoring and encouragement of (possibly 
excessive) risk taking by banks and other financial institutions.  
 
The Basel II Accord
1
 was designed to monitor and encourage sensible risk taking, using 
appropriate models of risk to calculate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and subsequent daily 
capital charges. VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential 
loss to be expected over a given period, and is now a standard tool in risk management. 
It has become especially important following the 1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, 
whereby banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted 
(and encouraged) to use internal models to forecast daily VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a 
detailed discussion). The last decade has witnessed a growing academic and 
professional literature comparing alternative modelling approaches to determine how to 
measure VaR, for portfolios of financial assets. Although such approaches are desired 
for portfolios of any size, especially large portfolios, statistical and computational 
difficulties continue to make such an analysis for large portfolios infeasible at present. 
 
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward 
institutions with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby 
                                                 
1
 When the Basel I Accord was concluded in 1988, no capital requirements were defined for market risk. 
However, regulators soon recognized the risks to a banking system if insufficient capital were held to 
absorb the large sudden losses from huge exposures in capital markets. During the mid-90’s, proposals 
were tabled for an amendment to the 1988 Accord, requiring additional capital over and above the 
minimum required for credit risk. Finally, a market risk capital adequacy framework was adopted in 1995 
for implementation in 1998. The 1995 Basel I Accord amendment provides a menu of approaches for 
determining market risk capital requirements, ranging from a simple to intermediate and advanced 
approaches. Under the advanced approach (that is, the internal model approach), banks are allowed to 
calculate the capital requirement for market risk using their internal models. The use of internal models 
was introduced in 1998 in the European Union. The 26 June 2004 Basel II framework, implemented in 
many countries in 2008 (though not yet in the USA), enhanced the requirements for market risk 
management by including, for example, oversight rules, disclosure, management of counterparty risk in 
trading portfolios. 
4 
actual returns are compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to 
assess the quality of the internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models 
led to a greater number of violations than could reasonably be expected, given the 
confidence level, the ADI is required to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 for 
the penalties imposed under the Basel II Accord). Penalties imposed on ADIs affect 
profitability directly through higher capital charges, and indirectly through the 
imposition of a more stringent external model to forecast VaR.
2
 This is one reason why, 
in practice, financial managers generally prefer risk management strategies that are 
passive and conservative rather than active and aggressive. 
 
Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as 
higher capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, ADIs might consider a 
strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how often ADIs should violate, and 
hence incur violation penalties, in any financial year (for further details, see McAleer 
and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), McAleer (2009), Caporin and McAleer (2010a), and 
McAleer et al. (2009)), Additionally, ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only a 
single risk model. McAleer et al. (2009, 2010b) propose a risk management strategy 
that consists in choosing from among different combinations of risk models to forecast 
VaR. They discuss a combination of forecasts that was characterized as an aggressive 
strategy, and another that was regarded as a conservative strategy.
3
  
 
Following such an approach, this paper suggests using a combination of VaR forecasts 
that also includes new extreme value VaR forecast models, such as DPOT and CEVT, 
to obtain a GFC-robust risk management strategy. Following McAleer (2010b), defines 
a crisis-robust strategy as an optimal risk management strategy that remains unchanged, 
regardless of whether it is used before, during or after a significant financial crisis, such 
as the 2008-09 GFC. Parametric methods for forecasting VaR are typically fitted to 
historical returns, assuming specific conditional distributions of returns, such as 
normality, Student-t, or generalized normal distribution. The VaR forecasts depend on 
                                                 
2
 In the 1995 amendment (p. 16), a similar capital requirement system was recommended, but the specific 
penalties were left to each national supervisor. The penalty structure contained in Table 1 of this paper 
belongs only to Basel II, and was not part of Basel I or its 1995 amendment. 
 
3
 This is a novel possibility. Technically, a combination of forecast models is also a forecast model. In 
principle, the adoption of a combination of forecast models by a bank or other financial institution is not 
forbidden by the Basel Accords, although it may be subject to regulatory approval. 
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the parametric model and the conditional distribution, and can be heavily affected by a 
few large observations.  
 
In this paper we also consider new extreme value models such as DPOT and CEVT, in 
addition to previously considered parametric and semi-parametric models. Some models 
provide many violations, but low daily capital charges. Moreover, these results can 
change drastically from tranquil to turbulent periods. Regardless of economic 
turbulence, the purpose is to establish a model to forecast VaR that provides a 
reasonable number of violations and daily capital charges. 
  
We estimate several univariate conditional volatility models to forecast VaR, assuming 
different returns distributions (specifically, Gaussian, Student-t and Generalized 
Normal). Additionally, we present 12 new strategies based on combinations of standard 
model VaR forecasts, namely: lowerbound, upperbound (as defined in McAleer et al. 
(2009)), the average, and nine additional strategies based on the 10
th,… 50th, … 90th 
percentiles. Additionally, we consider a DPOT model with c=2/3, another DPOT model 
with c=3/4, and a CEVT model. These models are compared over three different time 
periods to investigate whether we can establish a risk management strategy that is GFC- 
crisis-robust. We provide evidence that using the median of the point VaR forecasts of a 
set of univariate conditional volatility models is a GFC-robust risk measure, such that a 
risk management strategy based on the median forecast is found to be superior to 
alternative single and combined model alternatives.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main 
ideas of the Basel II Accord Amendment as it relates to forecasting VaR and daily 
capital charges. Section 3 reviews some of the most well-known models of conditional 
volatility used to forecast VaR, and the three new extreme value models. In Section 4 
the data used for estimation and forecasting are presented. Section 5 analyses the robust 
VaR forecasts before, during and after the 2008-09 GFC. Section 6 presents some 
conclusions. 
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2. Forecasting Value-at-Risk and Daily Capital Charges   
  
As is widely known, the Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges (DCC) 
must be set at the higher of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 
business days, multiplied by a factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation 
involves the actual negative returns exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a 
given day:
4
 
  
   
______
60t t-1DCC = sup - 3+ k VaR ,  - VaR  (1) 
 
where  
 
DCCt = daily capital charges, which is the higher of   60
______
t-1- 3+ k VaR  and  - VaR , 
 
tVaR  = Value-at-Risk for day t, 
 
tttt zYVaR ˆ
ˆ  , 
 
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days, 
 
tYˆ = estimated return at time t, 
 
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,  
 
tˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t, 
 
0 k 1    is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 1). 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
                                                 
4
 Our aim is to investigate the likely performance of the Basel II regulations. In this section we carry out 
our analysis applying the Basel II formulae to a period that includes the 2008-09 GFC, during which the 
Basel II Accord regulations were not fully implemented. 
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The multiplication factor
5
 (or penalty), k, depends on the central authority’s assessment 
of the ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple backtest. It is 
determined by the number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996, 2006)). It should be noted that the 
calculation of DCCt is undertaken in terms of obtaining the lower numerical value rather 
than evaluating statistically significant differences between measures. In this sense, the 
supremum of the two values in equation (1) is similar to a two-horse race, in which 
there can be only one winner.  
 
As discussed in Stahl (1997), the minimum multiplication factor of 3 is intended to 
compensate for various errors that can arise in model implementation, such as 
simplifying assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical 
errors that tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the model. Increases in the 
multiplication factor are designed to increase the confidence level that is implied by the 
observed number of violations to the 99 per cent confidence level, as required by 
regulators (for a detailed discussion of VaR, as well as exogenous and endogenous 
violations, see McAleer (2009), Jiménez-Martin et al. (2009), and McAleer et al. 
(2009)). 
 
In calculating the number of violations, ADIs are required to compare the forecasts of 
VaR with realised profit and loss figures for the previous 250 trading days. In 1995, the 
1988 Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988)) was amended to 
allow ADIs to use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1995)), However, ADIs that propose using internal models are 
required to demonstrate that their models are sound. Movement from the green zone to 
the red zone arises through an excessive number of violations. Although this will lead to 
a higher value of k, and hence a higher penalty, violations will also tend to be associated 
with lower daily capital charges.
6
 
 
                                                 
5
 The formula in equation (1) is contained in the 1995 amendment to Basel I, while Table 1 appears for 
the first time in the Basel II Accord in 2004.  
6
 The number of violations in a given period is an important (though not the only) guide for regulators to 
approve a given VaR model. 
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Value-at-Risk refers to the lower bound of a confidence interval for a (conditional) 
mean, that is, a “worst case scenario on a typical day”. If interest lies in modelling the 
random variable, 
 
Y
t
, it could be decomposed as follows: 
 
 1( | )t t t tY E Y F   . (2) 
 
This decomposition states that 
 
Y
t
 comprises a predictable component,
 
E(Y
t
| F
t1
) , which 
is the conditional mean, and a random component, 
 

t
. The variability of 
 
Y
t
, and hence 
its distribution, is determined by the variability of 
 

t
. If it is assumed that 
 

t
 follows a 
conditional distribution, such that: 
 
),(~ 2ttt D                                                         
 
where 
 

t
 and 
 

t
 are the conditional mean and standard deviation of 
 

t
, respectively, 
these can be estimated using a variety of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric 
methods. The VaR threshold for 
 
Y
t
 can be calculated as: 
 
 1( | )t t t tVaR E Y F   , (3) 
 
where   is the critical value from the distribution of 
 

t
 to obtain the appropriate 
confidence level. It is possible for 
 

t
 to be replaced by alternative estimates of the 
conditional standard deviation in order to obtain an appropriate VaR (for useful reviews 
of theoretical results for conditional volatility models, see Li et al. (2002) and McAleer 
(2005), who discusses a variety of univariate and multivariate, conditional, stochastic 
and realized volatility models).  
 
As discussed in McAleer et al. (2010b), some recent empirical studies (see, for example, 
Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001), Gizycki and Hereford (1998), and Pérignon et al. (2008)) 
have indicated that some financial institutions overestimate their market risks in 
9 
disclosures to the appropriate regulatory authorities, which can imply a costly restriction 
to the banks trading activity. ADIs may prefer to report high VaR numbers to avoid the 
possibility of regulatory intrusion. This conservative risk reporting suggests that 
efficiency gains may be feasible. In particular, as ADIs have effective tools for the 
measurement of market risk, while satisfying the qualitative requirements, ADIs could 
conceivably reduce daily capital charges by implementing a context-dependent market 
risk disclosure policy. For a discussion of alternative approaches to optimize VaR and 
daily capital charges, see McAleer (2009) and McAleer et al. (2009). 
 
The next section describes several volatility models that are widely used to forecast the 
1-day ahead conditional variances and VaR thresholds.  
 
3. Models for Forecasting VaR 
 
It is well known that ADIs can use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds 
(see, for example, McAleer et al. (2010b)). There are alternative time series models for 
estimating conditional volatility. In what follows, we present several conditional 
volatility models that are widely used in the financial econometrics literature to evaluate 
strategic market risk disclosure, namely GARCH and GJR, with normal, Student-t and 
Generalized normal distribution errors, where the parameters are estimated.  
 
These models are chosen as they are well known and widely used in the literature. For 
an extensive discussion of the theoretical properties of several of these models, see Ling 
and McAleer (2002a, 2002b, 2003a) and Caporin and McAleer (2010a). As an 
alternative to estimating the parameters, we also consider the exponential weighted 
moving average (EWMA) method by Riskmetrics
 
(1996) and Zumbauch, (2007) that 
calibrates the unknown parameters. We include a section on these models to present 
them in a unified framework and notation, and to make explicit the specific versions we 
are using. Apart from EWMA, the models are presented in increasing order of 
complexity. 
 
 
3.1 GARCH 
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For a wide range of financial data series, time-varying conditional variances can be 
explained empirically through the AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model, which was proposed by Engle (1982). When the time-varying 
conditional variance has both autoregressive and moving average components, this 
leads to the Generalized ARCH(p,q), or GARCH(p,q), model of Bollerslev (1986). It is 
very common to impose the widely estimated GARCH(1,1) specification in advance.  
 
Consider the stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for daily returns, ty :   
 
 t 1 2 t-1 t 2y = φ +φ y +ε , φ <1  (4) 
 
for nt ,...,1 , where the shocks to returns are given by:  
 
 
t t t t
2
t t-1 t-1
ε = η h , η ~ iid(0,1)
h = ω+αε + βh ,
 (5) 
 
and 0, 0, 0      are sufficient conditions to ensure that the conditional variance 
0th . The stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model can be modified to incorporate a non-
stationary ARMA(p,q) conditional mean and a stationary GARCH(r,s) conditional 
variance, as in Ling and McAleer (2003b). 
 
3.2 GJR 
 
In the symmetric GARCH model, the effects of positive shocks (or upward movements 
in daily returns) on the conditional variance, th , are assumed to be the same as the 
negative shocks (or downward movements in daily returns). In order to accommodate 
asymmetric behaviour, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1992) proposed a model 
(hereafter GJR), for which GJR(1,1) is defined as follows:  
 
 
2
t t-1 t-1 t-1h = ω+(α+γI(η ))ε + βh ,  (6) 
 
where 0,0,0,0    are sufficient conditions for ,0th  and )( tI   is an 
indicator variable defined by: 
11 
 
  
1, 0
0, 0
t
t
t
I




 

 (7) 
 
 as t  has the same sign as t . The indicator variable differentiates between positive 
and negative shocks, so that asymmetric effects in the data are captured by the 
coefficient  . For financial data, it is expected that 0  because negative shocks 
have a greater impact on risk than do positive shocks of similar magnitude. The 
asymmetric effect, ,  measures the contribution of shocks to both short run persistence, 
2  , and to long run persistence, 2    .  
 
Although GJR permits asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks of equal 
magnitude on conditional volatility, the special case of leverage, whereby negative 
shocks increase volatility while positive shocks decrease volatility (see Black (1976) for 
an argument using the debt/equity ratio), cannot be accommodated (for further details 
on asymmetry versus leverage in the GJR model, see Caporin and McAleer (2010b)). 
 
3.3 Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
 
As an alternative to estimating the parameters of the appropriate conditional volatility 
models, Riskmetrics
 
(1996) developed a model which estimates the conditional 
variances and covariances based on the exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) method, which is, in effect, a restricted version of the ARCH( ) model. This 
approach forecasts the conditional variance at time t as a linear combination of the 
lagged conditional variance and the squared unconditional shock at time 1t  . The 
EWMA model calibrates the conditional variance as: 
 
 
2
t t-1 t-1h = λh +(1- λ)ε   (8) 
 
where   is a decay parameter. Riskmetrics (1996) suggests that   should be set at 0.94 
for purposes of analysing daily data. As no parameters are estimated, there are no 
moment or log-moment conditions. 
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3.4 Extreme Value Theory models 
 
In what follows, we present two Extreme Value Theory (EVT) models, namely 
Conditional EVT (CEVT) and Duration based Peaks Over Threshold (DPOT). The first 
is well known and is widely used in the literature. The second was recently proposed by 
Araújo Santos and Fraga Alves (2011). Such models might be expected to be useful in 
explaining financial data, especially in the presence of extreme shocks that arise during 
a GFC. 
 
 3.4.1 CEVT 
 
This approach is a two-stage hybrid method which combines a time-varying volatility 
model with the Peaks Over Threshold method from EVT (for details about the POT 
method, see Embrechts et al. (1997)). Diebold et al. (1998) proposed in a first step the 
standardization of the returns through the conditional means and variances estimated 
with a time-varying volatility model, and in a second step, the estimation of a p-quantile 
using EVT and the standardized   returns.  McNeil and Frey (2000) combine an AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) process, assuming normal innovations, with the POT method. The filter 
with normal innovations, while capable of removing the majority of clusterings, will 
frequently be a misspecified model for returns. In order to accommodate this 
misspecification, Kuester et al. (2006) suggested a filter with the skewed t distribution. 
We will denote this model as CEVT.  
 
The one-day-ahead VaR forecast is calculated with the following equation: 
  
         
                           , (9) 
 
where         and         are the estimated conditional mean and conditional standard 
deviation for t+1, respectively, obtained from a AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) process. Moreover, 
pz is a quantile p estimate, obtained with the POT method and the standardized 
residuals that are calculated as 
 
                
               
      
   
       
  
   (10) 
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Several studies have concluded that conditional EVT is the method with better out-of-
sample performance to forecast one-day-ahead VaR (see, for example, McNeil and Frey 
(2000), Byström (2004), Bekiros and Georgoutsos (2005),  Kuester et al. (2006), 
Ghorbel and Trabelsi (2008), and Ozun et al. (2010)). The POT method requires the 
choice of a high threshold u. We choose the threshold, u, such that 10% of the values 
are larger than u (see McNeil and Frey (2000) for a simulation study that supports a 
similar choice). 
 
3.4.2 DPOT Model 
 
The POT method is based on the excesses over u and on the Pickands-Balkema-de Haan 
Theorem (see Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands(1975)). For distributions in 
the maximum domain of attraction of an extreme value distribution, this theorem states 
that when u converges to the right end point (xF) of the distribution, the excess 
distribution [ | ]P X u X u  converges to the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD): 
 
 
 
1/
,
1 (1 / ) , 0
( )
1 exp / , 0,
y
G y
y

 
  
 
   
 
  
  (11) 
 
where 0  , and the support is 0y  when 0,   and 0 /y     when 0  . 
 
Smith (1987) proposed a tail estimator based on a GPD approximation to the excess 
distribution. Inverting this estimator gives an equation to calculate the VaR forecast. 
With financial time series, a relation between the excesses and the durations between 
excesses is usually observed. Araújo Santos and Fraga Alves (2011) proposed using this 
dependence to improve the risk forecasts with duration-based POT models (DPOT). For 
estimation, these models use the durations, at time of excess i, as the preceding v
excesses ( ,i vd ). At time t, ,t vd denotes the duration until t as the preceding v  excesses.  
The DPOT model assumes the GPD for the excess tY  above ,u  such that  
 
                     
  ,  (12) 
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where  and   are parameters to be estimated. The proposed DPOT model implies, for
1  , a conditional expected value for the excess, and for 1/ 2  , a conditional 
variance, both of which are dependent on ,t vd : 
 
 
2( )
[ | ] ( 1), [ | ] ( 1/ 2).
1 (1 2 )
t t
t t t tE Y VAR Y
 
 
 
     
 
 (13) 
 
Inverting the tail estimator based on the conditional GPD gives the equation to calculate 
the DPOT VaR forecast: 
 
         
         
        
 
        
  
 
   
 
 
     (14) 
 
where     denotes the sample size,   the number of excesses,   and    are estimators of 
 and , respectively. We choose 3v  and {2 / 3, 3 / 4}c , as values of c close or 
equal to 3/4 have been shown to exhibit the best results (see Araújo Santos and Fraga 
Alves (2011)). 
 
3.5 Unconditional Coverage and Independence Tests 
 
The primary tool for assessing the accuracy of the interval forecasts is to monitor the 
binary sequence generated by observing whether the return on day t+1 is in the tail 
region specified by the VaR at time t. This is referred to as the hit sequence, namely: 
 
 
1 1|
1
1 1|
1 if VaR ( )
( )
0 if VaR ( ).
t t t
t
t t t
R p
I p
R p
 

 

 

                      (15) 
 
Christoffersen (1998) showed that evaluating interval forecasts can be reduced to 
examining whether the hit sequence satisfies the unconditional coverage (UC) and 
independence (IND) properties. In order to test the UC hypothesis, we apply the  
(Kupiec, 1995) test and to to test the IND hypothesis, we apply two tests. Along the 
same lines as Engle and Manganelli (2004), Berkowitz et al. (2009) consider the 
autoregression: 
 1 1 2 | 1VaR ( ) ,t t t t tI I p         (16) 
15 
and propose the logit model. We can test the IND hypothesis with a likelihood ratio test 
of the null hypothesis 1 2 0,    where the asymptotic distribution is chi-square with 
2 degrees of freedom. This is the CAViaR independence test of Engle and Manganelli 
(CAViaR).  
The second independence test was recently developed by Araújo Santos and Fraga 
Alves (2010), and is based on the following test statistic: 
 
                
      
 
 
 
 
    
       (17) 
 
where N:ND  and  N/2 :ND  are the maximum and the median, respectively, of durations 
between consecutive violations and until the first violation. Under the null hypothesis, 
the asymptotic distribution is Gumbel. This new test is suitable for detecting clusters of 
violations, is based on an exact distribution (see Propositions 3.1 and 3.5 in Araújo 
Santos and Fraga Alves (2010)), is pivotal in the sense that is based on a distribution 
that does not depend on an unknown parameter, and outperforms, in terms of power, 
existing procedures in realistic settings, with few exceptions. We refer to this test as the 
MM ratio test. The R code for implementing the test is available in Araújo Santos 
(2010). 
 
4. Data  
 
Compared with the empirical analysis in McAleer et al. (2010b), the updated data used 
for estimation and forecasting are the closing daily prices for Standard and Poor’s 
Composite 500 Index (S&P500), which were obtained from the Ecowin Financial 
Database, initially for the period 3 January 2000 to 25 March 2011. Although it is 
unlikely that an ADI’s typical market risk portfolio only tracks the S&P500 index, it is 
used as an illustration of the broad movements of profits and losses of the equity 
portfolios of many large ADIs. McAleer et al. (2011) estimate similar VaR models for 
the following stock indexes: French CAC 40 (CAC), German DAX 30 (DAX), US Dow 
Jones 30 (DJ), UK FTSE100 (FTSE), Hong Kong Hang Seng (HSI), Spanish IBEX  
(IBEX), Japanese Nikkei 225 (Nikkei), and Swiss SMI (SMI). 
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If tP  denotes the market price, the returns at time t ( )tR  are defined as: 
  1log / t t tR P P . (8) 
 
[Insert Figures 1-2 and Table 2 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the S&P500 returns, for which the descriptive statistics are given in 
Table 2. Extremely high positive and negative returns are evident from September 2008 
onward, and these continue well into 2009. The mean is close to zero, and the range is 
between -9.47% and +10.96%. The Jarque-Bera Lagrange multiplier test rejects the null 
hypothesis of normally distributed returns. The series display high kurtosis, as can be 
seen in the histogram. This would seem to indicate the existence of extreme 
observations, which is not surprising for daily financial returns data. 
 
Several measures of volatility are available in the literature. In order to gain some 
intuition, we adopt the measure proposed in Franses and van Dijk (1999), where the true 
volatility of returns is defined as: 
 
   
2
1|  t t t tV R E R F , (9) 
 
where 1tF  is the information set at time t-1.  
 
Figure 2 shows the S&P500 volatility, as the square root of Vt in equation (9). The 
series exhibit clustering that should be captured by an appropriate time series model. 
The volatility of the series appears to be high during the early 2000s, followed by a 
quiet period from 2003 to the beginning of 2007. Volatility increases dramatically after 
August 2008, due in large part to the worsening global credit environment. This 
increase in volatility is even higher in October 2008. In less than four weeks in October 
2008, the S&P500 index plummeted by 27.1%. In less than three weeks in November 
2008, starting the morning after the US elections, the S&P500 index plunged a further 
25.2%. Overall, from late August 2008, US stocks fell by an unbelievable 42.2% to 
reach a low on 20 November 2008.  
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An examination of daily movements in the S&P500 index from 2000 suggests that large 
changes by historical standards are 4% in either direction. From January 2000 to August 
2008, there was a 0.31% chance of observing an increase of 4% or more in one day, and 
a 0.18% chance of seeing a reduction of 4% or more in one day. Therefore, 99.5% of 
movements in the S&P500 index during this period had daily swings of less than 4%. 
Prior to September 2008, the S&P500 index had only 7 days with massive 4% gains, but 
since September 2008, there have been a further 12 such days. On the downside, before 
the current stock market meltdown, the S&P500 index had only 4 days with huge 4% or 
more losses whereas, during the recent panic, there were a further 17 such days.  
 
This comparison is between more than 99 months and less than 6 months. During the 
GFCthe chandes of 4% or more gain days increased 80 times, while the chances of 4% 
or more loss days increased 32 times. Such movements in the S&P500 index are truly 
exceptional. 
 
5. Robust Forecasting of VaR and Evaluation Framework 
 
As observed in McAleer et al. (2010a,b), the GFC has affected the best risk 
management strategies by changing the optimal model for minimizing daily capital 
charges. The objective here is to provide a robust risk management strategy, namely one 
that does not change over time, even in the context of a GFC. This robust risk 
management strategy also has to lead to daily capital charges that are not excessive, and 
violation frequencies that are compatible with the Basel II Accord. As stated previously, 
the calculation of daily capital charges, and the evaluation of a supremum to satisfy the 
Basel requirements, is based on numerical rather than statistical considerations. 
 
The Basel II Accord does not stipulate that ADIs should restrict themselves to using 
only a single risk model. We propose a risk management strategy that consists of 
choosing a forecast from among different combinations of alternative risk models to 
forecast VaR. McAleer et al. (2010a) developed a risk management strategy that used 
combinations of several models for forecasting VaR. It was found that an aggressive 
risk management strategy (namely, choosing the supremum of VaR forecasts, or 
upperbound) yielded the lowest mean capital charges and largest number of violations. 
On the other hand, a conservative risk management strategy (namely, by choosing the 
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infinum, or lowerbound) had far fewer violations, and correspondingly higher mean 
daily capital charges.  
 
In this paper, we forecast VaR using combinations of the forecasts of individual VaR 
models, namely the rth percentile of the VaR forecasts of a set of univariate conditional 
volatility models. Alternative single models with different error distributions, several 
combinations, and alternative methodologies are compared over three different time 
periods to investigate which, if any, of the risk management strategies may be robust.  
 
We conduct an exercise to analyze the performance of existing VaR forecasting models, 
as permitted under the Basel II framework, when applied to the S&P500 index. 
Additionally, we analyze twelve new strategies based on combinations of the previous 
standard single-model forecasts of VaR, namely: lowerbound (0
th
 percentile), 
upperbound (100
th
 percentile), average, and nine additional strategies based on the 10
th
 
through to the 90
th
 percentiles. We also consider the output of extreme value models 
such as DPOT(C=2/3), DPOT(c=3/4) and CEVT. It is intended to determine whether 
we can select a robust VaR forecast irrespective of the time period, and to provide 
reasonable daily capital charges and number of violation penalties.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
In Figure 3 we show the S&P500 returns together with VaR forecasts of a selection of 
forecasting models. The upper line is the S&P500 returns. The lower thick line is the 
median of the forecasts of the individual models. The thinner red line in between is the 
VaR forecast by the DPOT(C=2/3) model and the black line is the VaR forecast of 
Riskmetrics.   It can be seen that, while the median and Riskmetrics are not far from 
each other most of the time, DPOT is more aggressive during the GFC while it is often 
times more conservative after the crisis.   
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
Figure 4 shows the daily capital charges corresponding to each of the above models, 
together with the S&P500 returns.  The upper line is the S&P500 returns, while the 
thick line corresponds to the median, the thin red line corresponds to DPOT(c=2/3), and 
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the thin blue line corresponds to Riskmetrics. It can be seen first that the three strategies 
lead to different capital charges. Notice that DPOT(c=2/3) is more aggressive than the 
median before and during the crisis, while it is generally more conservative after the 
crisis.  The lines are sufficiently distinct as to lead to significant differences in the 
performance of the different forecasting models.  
 
5.1 Evaluating Crisis-Robust Risk Management Strategies 
 
In Table 3, we compare the performance of the different VaR forecasting models using 
several economic and statistical criteria. The individual VaR models are Riskmetrics 
and GARCH, GJR, with, respectively normal, t and generalized normal errors. 
Additionaly we use three extreme value models: conditional EVT, DPOT(c=2/3), and 
DPOT(c=3/4). We also use three combination models, namely: infinum, supremum and 
the median. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
We also evaluate the forecasting behaviour before, during and after the GFC. Before the 
GFC is from 2 January 2008 to 11 August 2008, during the GFC is from 12 August 
2008 to 9 March 2009, and after the GFC is from 10 March 2009 to 16 March 2011. In 
each of the calculated measures, the numerical value is dominant relative to any 
statistical accuracy measures. 
 
We evaluate the models according to the following criteria: 
 
1. The percentage of time for which the model would keep the ADI in the red zone 
of the Basel II Accord (see Table 1). 
2. The average daily capital charges incurred by the ADI using a given forecasting 
model (entries are percentages). 
3. The Failure rate, which measures the percentage of violations incurred during 
the period. 
4. The Kupiec independence test (entries are p-values).  
5. The MM independence test (entries are p-values). 
6. The CAViaR independence test (entries are p-values). 
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We exclude from consideration models that lead the ADIs to the red zone in at least one 
period, namely: Riskmetrics, GARCH-n, GJR-n, DPOT(c=2/3), and Supremum.  
 
 The best model before the crisis is GARCH-gnd, with no days in red, and the 
lowest average daily capital charges of 9.32%, while the temporal independence 
of the violations is not rejected by any of the 2 tests.  
 During the crisis, the best model is DPOT(c=3/4), with no days in red and the 
lowest average daily capital charges of 19.73%, while independence is not 
rejected by either of the 2 tests, although it has a high failure rate of 4.8%.  
 After the crisis, the best model is GJR-gnd, with no days in red, minimum 
average daily capital charges of 10.47 %, and independence not rejected by the 2 
independence tests.  
 
The lowest average daily capital charges across the whole sample used for comparison, 
of all the models corresponds to GJR-gnd, with a value of 12.87%, while the second 
lowest corresponds to the Median, with a value of 13.03%, as seen in the last column. 
 
The median is, respectively, third, third and second across the three periods in terms of 
daily capital charges. No risk model is always found to be superior to its competitors, as 
there is no strategy that optimizes every evaluation statistic for the three sub-periods. 
Nonetheless, the 50
th
 percentile strategy (namely, the median) is found to be robust, as it 
produces adequate VaR forecasts that exhibit stable results across different periods 
relative to the other risk models. In general, the median strategy provides a robust VaR 
forecast, regardless of whether there is a GFC. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we proposed robust risk forecasts that use combinations of several 
conditional volatility models for forecasting VaR. These include parametric as well as 
extreme value models. Different strategies for combining models were compared over 
three different time periods, using S&P500 to investigate whether we can determine a 
GFC-robust risk management strategy.  
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Backtesting provided evidence that a risk management strategy based on VaR forecast 
corresponding to the 50
th
 percentile (median) of the VaR forecasts of a set of univariate 
conditional volatility models is robust in that it yields reasonable daily capital charges, 
numbers of violations that do not jeopardize institutions that might use it and, more 
importantly, is invariant before, during and after the 2008-09 GFC.  
 
It is worth noting that, as in McAleer et al. (2010a), the VaR model that minimizes DCC 
before, during and after the GFC can, and does, change frequently. In our case, they 
were, respectively: GARCH-gnd, DPOT(c=3/4) and GJR-gnd. Although the median is 
not derived as necessarily the best model for minimizing DCC and the number of 
violation penalties, it is nevertheless a model that usefully balances daily capital charges 
and violation penalties in minimizing DCC.  
 
The idea of combining different VaR forecasting models is entirely within the spirit of 
the Basel II Accord, although its use may require approval by the regulatory authorities, 
as for any forecasting model. This approach is not computationally demanding, even 
though several models have to be specified and estimated over time. Further research is 
needed to compute the standard errors of the forecasts of the combination models, 
including the median forecast, using numerical methods. 
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Figure 1. Daily Returns on S&P500 Index 
 13 January 2003 – 25 March 2011 
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Figure 2. Daily Volatility in S&P500 Returns 
13 January 2003 – 25 March 2011 
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Figure 3. VaR for S&P500 Returns 
13 January 2003 – 25 March 2011 
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Figure 4.  Daily Capital Charges and S&P500 Returns 
13 January 2003 – 25 March 2011 
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Table 1: Basel Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. 
The penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for 
the number of violations and not their magnitude, either 
individually or cumulatively.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for S&P500 Returns (%) 
13 January 2000 – 25 March 2011 
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Series: RETURNS
Sample 13/01/2003 25/03/2011
Observations 2065
Mean       0.016926
Median   0.084217
Maximum  10.95720
Minimum -9.469514
Std. Dev.   1.330519
Skewness  -0.263573
Kurtosis   14.03100
Jarque-Bera  10493.72
Probability  0.000000
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Table 3. Comparing Alternative Models of Volatility 
Before 
 
During 
 
After  
  % in red  AvDCC % FailRa Kupiec MM  CAViaR  
 
% in red  DCC % FailRa Kupiec MM  CAViaR  
 
% in red  DCC % FailRa Kupiec MM  CAViaR  Av_DCC_all 
RSKM 0.0 9.23 2.0 0.29 0.52 0.28   0.0 24.68 4.1 0.00 0.45 0.02   21.7 11.34 2.5 0.00 0.04 0.03 13.31 
                                         GARCH-n 0.0 8.52 3.9 0.01 0.30 0.16 
 
71.0 24.44 4.8 0.00 0.05 0.00 
 
19.5 11.55 2.9 0.00 0.27 0.04 13.27 
                                         GARCH-t 0.0 10.94 0.7 0.65 - 0.36 
 
0.0 26.11 1.4 0.66 0.59 0.01 
 
0.0 13.53 0.2 0.02 - 0.18 15.28 
                                        GARCH-gnd 0.0 9.32 2.6 0.09 0.44 0.25 
 
0.0 25.72 2.1 0.26 0.84 0.00 
 
0.0 11.31 1.5 0.25 0.75 0.02 13.50 
                                         GJR-n 0.0 8.57 3.3 0.03 0.55 0.45 
 
0.0 24.16 3.5 0.02 0.33 0.00 
 
11.8 11.43 3.1 0.00 0.00 0.11 13.16 
                                        GJR-t 0.0 10.75 0.0 0.08 - - 
 
0.0 26.06 1.4 0.66 0.59 0.01 
 
0.0 12.61 0.6 0.30 0.10 0.00 14.65 
                                         GJR-gnd 0.0 9.33 2.0 0.29 0.67 0.64 
 
0.0 25.16 2.1 0.26 0.84 0.00 
 
0.0 10.47 1.5 0.25 0.86 0.01 12.87 
                                        Cond_EVT 0.0 10.05 1.3 0.72 0.23 0.21 
 
0.0 23.64 1.4 0.66 0.59 0.01 
 
0.0 11.77 0.6 0.30 0.22 0.00 13.56 
                                         DPOT(c=2/3) 0.0 9.16 2.0 0.29 0.60 0.71  37.2 19.36 5.5 0.00 0.43 0.13  0.0 12.99 0.4 0.11 0.43 0.53 13.40 
                                         DPOT(c=3/4) 0.0 9.71 0.7 0.65 - 0.63 
 
0.0 19.73 4.8 0.00 0.81 0.19 
 
0.0 12.71 0.4 0.11 0.53 0.51 13.40 
                                         Inf. 0.0 11.84 0.0 0.08 - - 
 
0.0 27.32 1.4 0.66 0.59 0.30 
 
0.00 14.37 0.0 0.00 - - 16.20 
                                         Sup. 0.0 7.95 3.9 0.01 0.31 0.58 
 
82.1 18.50 8.3 0.00 0.61 0.31 
 
88.8 11.11 3.9 0.00 0.23 0.29 11.84 
50
th
 Per 0.0 9.38 3.3 0.09 0.45 0.44  0.0 24.15 1.4 0.66 0.59 0.35  0.00 11.00 1.4 0.44 0.14 0.02 13.03 
 
Notes: Percentage of Days in red zone (% red), Average of Daily Capital Charges (AvDCC), Failure Rate (FailRa), P-values of the Unconditional coverage Kupiec test 
(Kupiec), independence test of Araújo Santos and Fraga Alves ( 2010) (MM), and the  CAViaR independence test of Engle and Manganelli (CAViaR). Average of  Daily 
Capital Charges for the whole period I denoted as (AV_DCC_all). 
